THE SYSTEM OF RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION OF HUMANS
(169) Everybody is exposed to ionising radiation from natural and man-made sources. It is convenient to think of the processes causing these human exposures as a network of events and situations. Each part of the network starts from a source. Radiation or radioactive material then passes through environmental or other pathways leading to the exposure of individuals. Finally, the exposure of individuals to radiation or radioactive materials leads to doses to these individuals. Protection can be achieved by taking action at the source, or at points in the exposure pathways, and occasionally by modifying the location or characteristics of the exposed individuals. For convenience, the environmental pathway is usually taken to include the link between the source of exposure and the doses received by the individuals. The available points of action have a substantial effect on the system of protection.
(170) The assumed proportional relationship between an increment of dose and an increment of risk of stochastic effects makes it possible to deal separately with different parts of this network of events and situations leading to exposure, and to select those parts that are of relevance in a given situation. To make these selections, however, it is necessary to define, for each part of the network, the objectives, the organisations (and individuals) responsible for protection, the lines of responsibility, and the feasibility of obtaining the necessary information. This remains a complex procedure, and the Commission suggests two simplifications in managing radiological situations.
(171) The first simplification was used in the 1990 Recommendations and recognises that individuals are subject to several categories of exposure, which can be dealt with separately (ICRP, 1991b) . For example, most workers who are exposed to radiation sources as part of their work are also exposed to environmental sources as members of the public, and to medical exposure as patients. The Commission's policy continues to be that the control of exposures due to work need not be influenced by the exposures from these other sources. This policy is still generally reflected in the present Recommendations by the separation of the exposure into three categories (see Section 5.3): occupational exposure, medical exposure of patients, and public exposure. The Commission continues to recommend that, for regulatory purposes, no attempt be made to add the exposures to the same individual from the different categories of exposure.
(172) The second simplification is that, in dealing with the network constituting a variety of exposure pathways, a distinction is drawn between source-related considerations and individual-related considerations (see Section 5.5). Although within each category of exposure individuals can be exposed to several sources, for the purposes of radiological protection each source, or group of sources, can be treated on its own (ICRP, 1991b) . It is then necessary to consider the exposure of all the individuals who could be exposed by this source or group of sources. This procedure is called a 'source-related assessment'.
(173) For the practical control of exposures, in Publication 60 the network of events and situations causing these exposures was divided into two broad classes of situations: practices and interventions. Practices were defined as human actions increasing exposure either by introducing whole new blocks of sources, pathways, and individuals, or by modifying the network of pathways from existing sources to individuals and thus increasing the exposure of individuals or the number of individuals so exposed. Interventions were defined as human actions that decrease the overall exposure by influencing the existing form of the network. These activities may remove existing sources, modify pathways or reduce the number of exposed individuals. In the revised system of protection the Recommendations of the Commission have now evolved from a process-based approach to an approach based on the characteristics of three types of radiation exposure situation, i.e., planned, emergency, and existing exposure situations (see Section 5.2).
The definition of a source
(174) The Commission uses the term 'source' to indicate any physical entity or procedure that results in a potentially quantifiable radiation dose to a person or group of persons. It can be a physical source (e.g., radioactive material or an x-ray machine), an installation (e.g., a hospital or a nuclear power plant), or procedures or groups of physical sources having similar characteristics (e.g., nuclear medicine procedures or background or environmental radiation). If radioactive substances are released from an installation into the environment, the installation as a whole may be regarded as a source; if they are already dispersed in the environment, the portion of them to which people are exposed may be considered a source. Most situations will give rise to a predominant source of exposure for any single individual, making it possible to treat sources singly when considering actions.
(175) In general, the definition of a source will be linked to the selection of the relevant protection strategy, as appropriate, for optimisation. Difficulties will arise if the policy is distorted, e.g., by artificially subdividing a source in order to avoid the need for protective action, or by excessively aggregating sources to exaggerate the need for action. Provided that the regulatory authority and the user (where one can be defined) both apply the spirit of the Commission's broad policies, practical agreements can be reached on the definition of a source.
Types of exposure situations
(176) The Commission intends its Recommendations to be applied to all sources and to individuals exposed to radiation in the following three types of exposure situations which address all conceivable circumstances.
Planned exposure situations are situations involving the deliberate introduction and operation of sources. Planned exposure situations may give rise both to exposures that are anticipated to occur (normal exposures) and to exposures that are not anticipated to occur (potential exposures; see Section 6.1.3). Emergency exposure situations are situations that may occur during the operation of a planned situation, or from a malicious act, or from any other unexpected situation, and require urgent action in order to avoid or reduce undesirable consequences. Existing exposure situations are exposure situations that already exist when a decision on control has to be taken, including prolonged exposure situations after emergencies.
It follows that what the Commission has called 'practices' could be the origin of planned, emergency, and existing exposure situations. Medical exposures of patients are also planned exposure situations, but because of the characteristics of such exposures, they are discussed separately. The principles of protection for planned situations also apply to occupational exposure in connection with existing and emergency exposure situations.
Categories of exposure
(177) The Commission distinguishes between three categories of exposures: occupational exposures, public exposures, and medical exposures of patients. Exposures of comforters and carers, and exposures of volunteers in research, are discussed in Chapter 7.
Occupational exposure
(178) Occupational exposure is defined by the Commission as all radiation exposure of workers incurred as a result of their work. The Commission has noted the conventional definition of occupational exposure to any hazardous agent as including all exposures at work, regardless of their source. However, because of the ubiquity of radiation, the direct application of this definition to radiation would mean that all workers should be subject to a regime of radiological protection. The Commission therefore limits its use of 'occupational exposures' to radiation exposures incurred at work as a result of situations that can reasonably be regarded as being the responsibility of the operating management (see also Section 6.3.1). Excluded exposures and exposures from exempt practices or exempt sources generally do not need to be accounted for in occupational protection.
(179) The employer has the main responsibility for the protection of workers. However, the licensee responsible for the source (if not identical to the employer) also has a responsibility for the radiological protection of workers. If workers are engaged in work that involves, or could involve, a source that is not under the control of their employer, the licensee and the employer should co-operate by the exchange of information and otherwise as necessary to facilitate proper radiological protection at the workplace.
Public exposure
(180) Public exposure encompasses all exposures of the public other than occupational exposures and medical exposures of patients (see Section 5.3.3). It is incurred as a result of a range of radiation sources. The component of public exposure due to natural sources is by far the largest, but this provides no justification for reducing the attention paid to smaller, but more readily controllable, exposures to man-made sources. Exposures of the embryo and fetus of pregnant workers are considered and regulated as public exposures.
Medical exposure of patients
(181) Radiation exposures of patients occur in diagnostic, interventional, and therapeutic procedures. There are several features of radiological practices in medicine that require an approach that differs from the radiological protection in other planned exposure situations. The exposure is intentional and for the direct benefit of the patient. Particularly in radiotherapy, the biological effects of high-dose radiation, e.g., cell killing, are used for the benefit of the patient to treat cancer and other diseases. The application of these Recommendations to the medical uses of radiation therefore requires separate guidance (see Chapter 7, which also discusses the medical exposure of comforters and carers and of volunteers in research).
The identification of the exposed individuals
(182) It is necessary to deal separately with at least three categories of exposed individuals, namely workers, the public, and patients. They essentially correspond to individuals whose exposures fall into the three categories of exposure defined in Section 5.3. A given individual may be exposed as a worker, and/or as a member of the public, and/or as a patient.
Workers
(183) A worker is defined by the Commission as any person who is employed, whether full time, part time, or temporarily, by an employer and who has recognised rights and duties in relation to occupational radiological protection. A self-employed person is regarded as having the duties of both an employer and a worker. Workers in medical professions involving radiation are occupationally exposed.
(184) One important function of an employer and/or licensee is that of maintaining control over the sources of exposure and over the protection of workers who are occupationally exposed. In order to achieve this, the Commission continues to recommend the classification of areas of work rather than the classification of workers. Requiring that the areas of workplaces containing sources be formally designated helps their control. The Commission uses two such designations: controlled areas and supervised areas. A controlled area is a defined area in which specific protection measures and safety provisions are, or could be, required for controlling normal exposures or preventing the spread of contamination during normal working conditions, and preventing or limiting the extent of potential exposures. A supervised area is one in which the working conditions are kept under review but special procedures are not normally needed. A controlled area is often within a supervised area, but need not be.
(185) Workers in 'controlled areas' of workplaces should be well informed and specially trained, and form a readily identifiable group. Such workers are most often monitored for radiation exposures incurred in the workplace, and occasionally may receive special medical surveillance.
The exposure of pregnant or breast-feeding workers (186) In the 1990 Recommendations, the Commission concluded that, for the purpose of controlling occupational exposure, there was no reason to distinguish between the two sexes. The Commission maintains this policy with these Recommendations. However, if a female worker has declared (i.e., notified her employer) that she is pregnant, additional controls have to be considered to protect the embryo/fetus. It is the Commission's policy that the methods of protection at work for women who are pregnant should provide a level of protection for the embryo/fetus broadly similar to that provided for members of the public. The Commission considers that this policy will be adequately applied if the mother is exposed, prior to her declaration of pregnancy, under the system of protection recommended by the Commission. Once an employer has been notified of a pregnancy, additional protection of the embryo/fetus should be considered. The working conditions of a pregnant worker, after declaration of pregnancy, should be such as to ensure that the additional dose to the embryo/fetus would not exceed about 1 mSv during the remainder of the pregnancy. Additional guidance on protection of an embryo/fetus exposed to radiation is provided in Section 7.4.
(187) The restriction of the dose to the embryo/fetus does not mean that it is necessary for pregnant women to avoid work with radiation or radioactive materials completely, or that they must be prevented from entering or working in designated radiation areas (see paragraph 184). It does, however, imply that the employer should carefully review the exposure conditions of pregnant women. In particular, if required, their working conditions should be changed such that, during pregnancy, the probability of accidental doses and radionuclide intakes is extremely low. Specific recommendations on the control of exposures to pregnant workers are given in Publications 84 and 88 (ICRP, 2000a (ICRP, , 2001a . The Commission has also published information in Publication 95 (ICRP, 2004c) that enables doses to offspring following intakes to breast-feeding mothers to be calculated. The Commission strongly recommends that in order to protect the embryo/fetus or infant, females who have declared that they are pregnant or are nursing should not be involved in emergency actions involving high radiation doses (ICRP, 2005a) .
(188) In Publication 88 (ICRP, 2001a), the Commission gave dose coefficients for the embryo, fetus, and newborn child from intakes of radionuclides by the mother before or during pregnancy. In general, doses to the embryo, fetus, and newborn child are similar to or less than those to the Reference Female. In Publication 95 (ICRP, 2004c) the Commission provided information on radiation doses to the breast-feeding infant due to intakes of radionuclides in maternal milk. For most of the radionuclides considered, doses to the infant from radionuclides ingested in breast milk are estimated to be small in comparison with doses to the Reference Female.
Exposures in aviation and in space (189) In Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991b) , the Commission recommended that exposures to cosmic radiation be part of occupational exposure in the operation of commercial jet aircraft and space flight. The Commission subsequently clarified its recommendation in Publication 75 (ICRP, 1997a) , indicating that it is not necessary to treat the exposure of frequent-flyer passengers as occupationally exposed for the purpose of control. Thus, essentially, only aircrew should be considered. At that time, the Commission had already noted that the only practical regulatory measures were controlling individual exposure through the control of flying time and route selection. The Commission maintains this view.
(190) Exceptional cases of cosmic radiation exposures, such as exposure in space travel, where doses may be significant and some type of control warranted, should be dealt with separately, taking into account the special type of situations that can give rise to this type of exposure.
Members of the public
(191) A member of the public is defined by the Commission as any individual who receives an exposure that is neither occupational nor medical (see also Section 5.4.3). A large range of different natural and man-made sources contribute to the exposure of members of the public.
(192) In general, especially for public exposure, each source will result in a distribution of doses over many individuals. For the purposes of protection of the public, the Commission has used the 'critical group' concept to characterise an individual receiving a dose that is representative of the more highly exposed individuals in the population (ICRP, 1977) . Dose restrictions have been applied to the mean dose in the appropriate critical group. Over the past decades, a considerable body of experience has been gained in the application of the critical group concept. There have also been developments in the techniques used to assess doses to members of the public, notably the increasing use of probabilistic techniques. The adjective 'critical' has the connotation of a crisis, which was never intended by the Commission. Furthermore, the word 'group' may be confusing in the context where the assessed dose is to an individual.
(193) The Commission now recommends the use of the 'Representative Person' for the purpose of radiological protection of the public instead of the earlier critical group concept. The Commission provides guidance on characterising the Representative Person and assessing doses to the Representative Person in Publication 101 (ICRP, 2006a) .
(194) The Representative Person may be hypothetical, but it is important that the habits (e.g., consumption of foodstuffs, breathing rate, location, usage of local resources) used to characterise the Representative Person are typical habits of a small number of individuals representative of those most highly exposed and not the extreme habits of a single member of the population. Consideration may be given to some extreme or unusual habits, but they should not dictate the characteristics of the Representative Persons considered.
Patients
(195) The Commission defines the patient as an individual who receives an exposure associated with a diagnostic, interventional, or therapeutic procedure. The Commission's dose limits and dose constraints are not recommended for individual patients because they may reduce the effectiveness of the patient's diagnosis or treatment, thereby doing more harm than good. The emphasis is therefore on the justification of the medical procedures and on the optimisation of protection and, for diagnostic procedures, the use of diagnostic reference levels (see Chapter 7).
(196) The exposure of patients who are pregnant is dealt with in Section 7.4.
Levels of radiological protection
(197) In the 1990 Recommendations it was noted that, provided that individual doses are well below the thresholds for harmful deterministic effects, the effect of a contribution to an individual dose from a source is independent of the effects of doses from other sources. For many purposes, each source or group of sources could usually be treated on its own. It is then necessary to consider the exposure of individuals exposed by this source or group of sources. This procedure is called a 'source-related' approach. The Commission now emphasises the primary importance of the source-related approach, because action can be taken on a source to assure the protection of a group of individuals from that source.
(198) For planned exposure situations, the source-related restriction to the dose that individuals may incur is the dose constraint. For potential exposures, the corresponding concept is the risk constraint. For emergency and existing exposure situations, the source-related restriction is the reference level (see Sections 5.9, 6.2, and 6.3). The concepts of a dose constraint and reference level are used in the process of optimisation of protection to assist in ensuring that all exposures are kept as low as reasonably achievable, societal and economic factors being taken into account. Constraints and reference levels can thus be described as key parts in the optimisation process that will ensure appropriate levels of protection under the prevailing circumstances.
(199) It could be argued that the source-related restriction would not provide sufficient protection where there are multiple sources. However, the Commission presumes that there will generally be a dominant source, and the selection of the appropriate reference level or constraint ensures an adequate level of protection. The Commission still considers that the source-related principle of optimisation below the constraint or reference level is the most effective tool for protection, whatever the situation.
(200) In the specific case of planned exposure situations, separate restrictions on the sums of the occupational doses and on the sums of the public doses are required. The Commission refers to such individual-related restrictions as dose limits (see Section 5.10) and the corresponding assessment of doses is called 'individual-related'.
(201) It is rarely possible, however, to assess the total exposure of an individual from all such sources. It is therefore necessary to make approximations to the dose to be compared with the quantitative limit, especially in the case of public exposure. For occupational exposures, the approximations are more likely to be accurate because the operating management has access to the necessary information to identify and control the dose from all the relevant sources.
(202) Figure 3 illustrates the differences in concept between the use of individual dose limits in planned situations and constraints or reference levels for protection from a source in all situations. 5.6. The principles of radiological protection (203) In the 1990 Recommendations, the Commission gave principles of protection for practices separately from intervention situations. The Commission continues to regard these principles as fundamental for the system of protection, and has now formulated a single set of principles that apply to planned, emergency, and existing exposure situations. In these Recommendations, the Commission also clarifies how the fundamental principles apply to radiation sources and to the individual, as well as how the source-related principles apply to all controllable situations.
Two principles are source-related and apply in all exposure situations
The principle of justification: Any decision that alters the radiation exposure situation should do more good than harm. This means that, by introducing a new radiation source, by reducing existing exposure, or by reducing the risk of potential exposure, one should achieve sufficient individual or societal benefit to offset the detriment it causes. 
ICRP Publication 103
The principle of optimisation of protection: the likelihood of incurring exposures, the number of people exposed, and the magnitude of their individual doses should all be kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors.
This means that the level of protection should be the best under the prevailing circumstances, maximising the margin of benefit over harm. In order to avoid severely inequitable outcomes of this optimisation procedure, there should be restrictions on the doses or risks to individuals from a particular source (dose or risk constraints and reference levels).
One principle is individual-related and applies in planned exposure situations
The principle of application of dose limits: The total dose to any individual from regulated sources in planned exposure situations other than medical exposure of patients should not exceed the appropriate limits recommended by the Commission.
(204) Regulatory dose limits are determined by the regulatory authority, taking account of international recommendations, and apply to workers and to members of the public in planned exposure situations.
Justification
(205) The Commission recommends that, when activities involving an increased or decreased level of radiation exposure, or a risk of potential exposure, are being considered, the expected change in radiation detriment should be explicitly included in the decision-making process. The consequences to be considered are not confined to those associated with the radiation -they include other risks and the costs and benefits of the activity. Sometimes, the radiation detriment will be a small part of the total. Justification thus goes far beyond the scope of radiological protection. It is for these reasons that the Commission only recommends that justification require that the net benefit be positive. To search for the best of all the available alternatives is a task beyond the responsibility of radiological protection authorities.
Application of the principle of justification
(206) There are two different approaches to applying the principle of justification in situations involving occupational and public exposure, which depend upon whether or not the source can be directly controlled. The first approach is used in the introduction of new activities where radiological protection is planned in advance and the necessary actions can be taken on the source. Application of the justification principle to these situations requires that no planned exposure situation should be introduced unless it produces sufficient net benefit to the exposed individuals or to society to offset the radiation detriment it causes. Judgements on whether it would be justifiable to introduce or continue particular types of planned situation involving exposure to ionising radiation are important. The justification may need to be re-examined as new information or technology becomes available.
(207) The second approach is used where exposures can be controlled mainly by action to modify the pathways of exposure and not by acting directly on the source.
The main examples are existing exposure situations and emergency exposure situations. In these circumstances, the principle of justification is applied in making the decision as to whether to take action to avert further exposure. Any decision taken to reduce doses, which always have some disadvantages, should be justified in the sense that they should do more good than harm.
(208) In both approaches, the responsibility for judging the justification usually falls on governments or national authorities to ensure an overall benefit in the broadest sense to society and thus not necessarily to each individual. However, input to the justification decision may include many aspects that could be informed by users or other organisations or persons outside of government. As such, justification decisions will often be informed by a process of public consultation, depending upon, among other things, the size of the source concerned. There are many aspects of justification, and different organisations may be involved and responsible. In this context, radiological protection considerations will serve as one input to the broader decision process.
(209) Medical exposure of patients calls for a different and more detailed approach to the process of justification. The medical use of radiation should be justified, as is any other planned exposure situation, although that justification lies more often with the profession than with government or the competent regulatory authority. The principal aim of medical exposures is to do more good than harm to the patient, due account being taken of the radiation detriment from the exposure of the radiological staff and of other individuals. The responsibility for the justification of the use of a particular procedure falls on the relevant medical practitioners, who need to have special training in radiological protection. Justification of medical procedures therefore remains part of the Commission's Recommendations (see Section 7.1).
Unjustified exposures
(210) The Commission considers that certain exposures should be deemed to be unjustified without further analysis, unless there are exceptional circumstances. These include the following:
Increasing, by deliberate addition of radioactive substances or by activation, the activity of products such as food, beverages, cosmetics, toys, and personal jewellery or adornments. Radiological examination for occupational, health insurance, or legal purposes undertaken without reference to clinical indications, unless the examination is expected to provide useful information on the health of the individual examined or in support of important criminal investigations. This almost always means that a clinical evaluation of the image acquired must be carried out, otherwise the exposure is not justified.
Medical screening of asymptomatic population groups involving radiation exposure, unless the expected advantages for the individuals examined or for the population as a whole are sufficient to compensate for the economic and societal costs, including the radiation detriment. Account should be taken of the potential of the screening procedure for detecting disease, the likelihood of effective treatment of cases detected, and, for certain diseases, the advantages to the community of control of the disease.
Optimisation of protection
(211) The process of optimisation of protection is intended for application to those situations that have been deemed to be justified. The principle of optimisation of protection, with restriction on the magnitude of individual dose or risk, is central to the system of protection and applies to all three exposure situations: planned exposure situations, emergency exposure situations, and existing exposure situations.
(212) The principle of optimisation is defined by the Commission as the sourcerelated process to keep the likelihood of incurring exposures (where these are not certain to be received), the number of people exposed, and the magnitude of individual doses as low as reasonably achievable, taking economic and societal factors into account.
(213) The Recommendations of the Commission on how to apply the optimisation principle have been provided earlier (ICRP, 1983 (ICRP, , 1989 (ICRP, , 1991b (ICRP, , and 2006a , and these Recommendations remain valid and will not be repeated in detail here. The decisionaiding techniques are still essential to find the optimised radiological protection solution in an objective manner; these techniques include methods for quantitative optimisation such as cost-benefit analyses. The process of optimisation over the past decades has resulted in substantial reductions of occupational and public exposures.
(214) Optimisation is always aimed at achieving the best level of protection under the prevailing circumstances through an ongoing, iterative process that involves: evaluation of the exposure situation, including any potential exposures (the framing of the process); selection of an appropriate value for the constraint or reference level; identification of the possible protection options; selection of the best option under the prevailing circumstances; and implementation of the selected option.
(215) Experience has shown how optimisation of protection has improved radiological protection for planned situations. Constraints provide a desired upper bound for the optimisation process. Some sources and technologies are able to satisfy constraints that are set at a low level, while others are only able to meet constraints set at a higher level. This is normal and should be reflected in the freedom of regulatory authorities and others, as appropriate, to select values that are appropriate for particular circumstances.
(216) In all situations, the process of optimisation with the use of constraints or reference levels is applied in planning protective actions and in establishing the appropriate level of protection under the prevailing circumstances. The doses to be compared with the dose constraint or reference levels are usually prospective doses, i.e., doses that may be received in the future, as it is only those doses that can be influenced by decisions on protective actions. They are not intended as a form of retrospective dose limit.
(217) The optimisation of protection is a forward-looking iterative process aimed at preventing or reducing future exposures. It takes into account both technical and socio-economic developments and requires both qualitative and quantitative judgements. The process should be systematic and carefully structured to ensure that all relevant aspects are taken into account. Optimisation is a frame of mind, always questioning whether the best has been done in the prevailing circumstances, and whether all that is reasonable has been done to reduce doses. It also requires commitment at all levels in all concerned organisations as well as adequate procedures and resources.
(218) The best option is always specific to the exposure situation and represents the best level of protection that can be achieved under the prevailing circumstances. Therefore it is not relevant to determine, a priori, a dose level below which the optimisation process should stop. Depending on the exposure situation, the best option could be close to or well below the appropriate source-related constraint or reference level.
(219) Optimisation of protection is not minimisation of dose. Optimised protection is the result of an evaluation, which carefully balances the detriment from the exposure and the resources available for the protection of individuals. Thus the best option is not necessarily the one with the lowest dose.
(220) In addition to the reduction of the magnitude of individual exposures, a reduction of the number of exposed individuals should also be considered. The collective effective dose has been and remains a key parameter for optimisation of protection for workers. The comparison of protection options for the purpose of optimisation must entail a careful consideration of the characteristics of the individual exposure distribution within an exposed population.
(221) When exposures occur over large populations, large geographical areas, or long time periods, the total collective effective dose is not a useful tool for making decisions because it may aggregate information inappropriately and could be misleading for selecting protective actions. To overcome the limitations associated with collective effective dose, each relevant exposure situation must be carefully analysed to identify the individual characteristics and exposure parameters that best describe the exposure distribution among the concerned population for the particular circumstance. Such an analysis -by asking when, where and by whom exposures are received -results in the identification of various population groups with homogeneous characteristics for which collective effective doses can be calculated within the optimisation process, and for which an optimised protection strategy can be defined (see Section 4.4). In practical optimisation assessments, collective doses may often be truncated, because the assessments use the difference between the integrals defining the collective doses assigned to the various alternative protective options under consideration, rather than the full integrals (ICRP, 1983) .
(222) In Publications 77 and 81 (ICRP, 1997d (ICRP, , 1998b , the Commission recognised that both the individual doses and the size of the exposed population become increasingly uncertain as time increases. The Commission is of the opinion that in the decision-making process, owing to the increasing uncertainties, giving less weight to very low doses and to doses received in the distant future could be considered (see also Section 4.4.7). The Commission does not intend to give detailed guidance on such weighting, but rather stresses the importance of demonstrating in a transparent manner how any weighting has been carried out.
(223) All aspects of optimisation cannot be codified; rather, there should be a commitment by all parties to the optimisation process. Where optimisation becomes a matter for the regulatory authority, the focus should not be on specific outcomes for a particular situation, but rather on processes, procedures, and judgements. An open dialogue should be established between the authority and the operating management, and the success of the optimisation process will depend strongly on the quality of this dialogue.
(224) Societal values usually influence the final decision on the level of radiological protection. Therefore, while this report should be seen as providing decision-aiding recommendations mainly based on scientific considerations on radiological protection, the Commission's advice will be expected to serve as an input to a final (usually wider) decision-making process, which may include other societal concerns and ethical aspects, as well as considerations of transparency (ICRP, 2006a) . This decisionmaking process may often include the participation of relevant stakeholders rather than radiological protection specialists alone.
Dose constraints and reference levels
(225) The concepts of dose constraint and reference level are used in conjunction with the optimisation of protection to restrict individual doses. A level of individual dose, either as a dose constraint or a reference level, always needs to be defined. The initial intention would be to not exceed, or to remain at, these levels, and the ambition is to reduce all doses to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable, economic and societal factors being taken into account.
(226) For the sake of continuity with its earlier Recommendations (ICRP, 1991b), the Commission retains the term 'dose constraint' for this level of dose in planned exposure situations (with the exception of medical exposure of patients). For emergency exposure situations and existing exposure situations, the Commission proposes the term 'reference level' to describe this level of dose. The difference in terminology between planned and other exposure situations (emergency and existing) has been retained by the Commission to express the fact that, in planned situations, the restriction on individual doses can be applied at the planning stage, and the doses can be forecast so as to ensure that the constraint will not be exceeded. With the other situations a wider range of exposures may exist, and the optimisation process may apply to initial levels of individual doses above the reference level.
(227) Diagnostic reference levels are already being used in medical diagnosis (i.e., planned exposure situations) to indicate whether, in routine conditions, the levels of patient dose or administered activity from a specified imaging procedure are unusually high or low for that procedure. If so, a local review should be initiated to determine whether protection has been adequately optimised or whether corrective action is required.
(228) The chosen value for a constraint or a reference level will depend upon the circumstances of the exposure under consideration. It must also be realised that neither dose and risk constraints nor reference levels represent a demarcation between 'safe' and 'dangerous' or reflect a step change in the associated health risk for individuals.
(229) In Table 4 the different types of dose restrictions used in the Commission's system of protection (limits, constraints, reference levels) are shown in relation to type of exposure situation and category of exposure. In planned exposure situations, there are also risk constraints in order to take account of potential exposures.
Dose constraints
(230) A dose constraint is a prospective and source-related restriction on the individual dose from a source in planned exposure situations (except in medical exposure of patients), which serves as an upper bound on the predicted dose in the optimisation of protection for that source. It is a level of dose above which it is unlikely that protection is optimised for a given source of exposure, and for which, therefore, action must almost always be taken. Dose constraints for planned situations represent a basic level of protection and will always be lower than the pertinent dose limit. During planning it must be ensured that the source concerned does not imply doses exceeding the constraint. Optimisation of protection will establish an acceptable level of dose below the constraint. This optimised level then becomes the expected outcome of the planned protective actions. (231) The action necessary if a dose constraint is exceeded includes determining whether protection has been optimised, whether the appropriate dose constraint has been selected, and whether further steps to reduce doses to acceptable levels would be appropriate. For potential exposures, the corresponding source-related restriction is called a risk constraint (see Section 6.1.3). Treating a dose constraint as a target value is not sufficient, and optimisation of protection will be necessary to establish an acceptable level of dose below the constraint.
(232) The concept of dose constraints was introduced in Publication 60 as a means of ensuring that the optimisation process did not create inequity, i.e., the possibility that some individuals in an optimised protection scheme may be subject to much more exposure than the average: 'Most of the methods used in the optimisation of protection tend to emphasise the benefits and detriments to society and the whole exposed population. The benefits and detriments are unlikely to be distributed through society in the same way. Optimisation of protection may thus introduce a substantial inequity between one individual and another. This inequity can be limited by incorporating source-related restrictions on individual dose into the process of optimization. The Commission calls these source-related restrictions dose constraints, previously called upper bounds. They form an integral part of the optimization of protection. For potential exposures, the corresponding concept is the risk constraint.' (ICRP, 1991b) This statement continues to represent the Commission's view.
(233) For occupational exposures, the dose constraint is a value of individual dose used to limit the range of options such that only options expected to cause doses below the constraint are considered in the process of optimisation. For public exposure, the dose constraint is an upper bound on the annual doses that members of the public could receive from the planned operation of a specified controlled source. The Commission wishes to emphasise that dose constraints are not to be used or understood as prescriptive regulatory limits.
Reference levels
(234) In emergency or existing controllable exposure situations, the reference levels represent the level of dose or risk, above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur (cf. Section 6.2), and for which therefore protective actions should be planned and optimised. The chosen value for a reference level will depend upon the prevailing circumstances of the exposure situation under consideration.
(235) When an emergency exposure situation has occurred, or an existing exposure situation has been identified, and protective actions have been implemented, doses to workers and members of the public can be measured or assessed. The reference level may then assume a different function as a benchmark against which protection options can be judged retrospectively. The distribution of doses that has resulted from the implementation of a planned protective strategy may or may not include exposures above the reference level, depending on the success of the strategy. Efforts should, however, be aimed at reducing any exposures that are above the reference level to a level that is below, if possible. 5.9.3. Factors influencing the choice of source-related dose constraints and reference levels (236) At doses higher than 100 mSv, there is an increased likelihood of deterministic effects and a significant risk of cancer. For these reasons, the Commission considers that the maximum value for a reference level is 100 mSv incurred either acutely or in a year. Exposures above 100 mSv incurred either acutely or in a year would be justified only under extreme circumstances, either because the exposure is unavoidable or in exceptional situations such as the saving of life or the prevention of a serious disaster. No other individual or societal benefit would compensate for such high exposures (see ICRP, 2005a) .
(237) Many of the numerical criteria recommended by the Commission in Publication 60 and subsequent publications can be, with the exception of the limits, regarded as constraints or reference levels. The values fall into three defined bands (see Table 5 ) with the attributes described in the following paragraphs. The Commission considers that it is useful to present these values in this manner as it enables selection of an appropriate value for a constraint or a reference level for a specific situation that has not been addressed explicitly by the Commission.
(238) The Commission's banding of constraints and reference levels (see Table  5 ) applies across all three exposure situations and refers to the projected dose over a time period that is appropriate for the situation under consideration. Constraints for planned exposures and reference levels in existing situations are conventionally expressed as an annual effective dose (mSv in a year). In emergency situations the reference level will be expressed as the total residual dose to an individual as a result of the emergency that the regulator would plan not to exceed, either acute (and not expected to be repeated) or, in case of protracted exposure, on an annual basis.
(239) The first band, 1 mSv or less, applies to exposure situations where individuals receive exposures -usually planned -that may be of no direct benefit to them but the exposure situation may be of benefit to society. The exposure of members of the public from the planned operation of practices is a prime example of this type of situation. Constraints and reference levels in this band would be selected for situations where there is general information and environmental surveillance or monitoring or assessment and where individuals may receive information but no training. The corresponding doses would represent a marginal increase above the natural background and are at least two orders of magnitude lower than the maximum value for a reference level, thus providing a rigorous level of protection.
(240) The second band, greater than 1 mSv but not more than 20 mSv, applies in circumstances where individuals receive direct benefits from an exposure situation. Constraints and reference levels in this band will often be set in circumstances where there is individual surveillance or dose monitoring or assessment, and where individuals benefit from training or information. The constraints set for occupational exposure in planned exposure situations are examples. Exposure situations involving Reference level set for the highest planned residual dose from a radiological emergency.
Greater than 1 to 20 Individuals will usually receive benefit from the exposure situation but not necessarily from the exposure itself. Exposures may be controlled at source or, alternatively, by action in the exposure pathways.
Where possible, general information should be made available to enable individuals to reduce their doses.
For planned situations, individual assessment of exposure and training should take place.
Constraints set for occupational exposure in planned situations.
Constraints set for comforters and carers of patients treated with radiopharmaceuticals.
Reference level for the highest planned residual dose from radon in dwellings.
or less
Individuals are exposed to a source that gives them little or no individual benefit but benefits to society in general.
Exposures are usually controlled by action taken directly on the source for which radiological protection requirements can be planned in advance.
General information on the level of exposure should be made available. Periodic checks should be made on the exposure pathways as to the level of exposure.
Constraints set for public exposure in planned situations.
a Acute or annual dose. b In exceptional situations, informed volunteer workers may receive doses above this band to save lives, prevent severe radiation-induced health effects, or prevent the development of catastrophic conditions. c Situations in which the dose threshold for deterministic effects in relevant organs or tissues could be exceeded should always require action.
abnormally high levels of natural background radiation, or stages in post-accident rehabilitation may also be in this band.
(241) The third band, greater than 20 mSv but not more than 100 mSv, applies in unusual, and often extreme, situations where actions taken to reduce exposures would be disruptive. Reference levels and, occasionally for 'one-off' exposures below 50 mSv, constraints could also be set in this range in circumstances where benefits from the exposure situation are commensurately high. Action taken to reduce exposures in a radiological emergency is the main example of this type of situation. The Commission considers that a dose rising towards 100 mSv will almost always justify protective action. In addition, situations in which the dose threshold for deterministic effects in relevant organs or tissues could be exceeded should always require action (see also paragraph 83 in ICRP, 1999a).
(242) A necessary stage in applying the principle of optimisation of protection is the selection of an appropriate value for the dose constraint or the reference level. The first step is to characterise the relevant exposure situation in terms of the nature of the exposure, the benefits from the exposure situation to individuals and society, as well as other societal criteria, and the practicability of reducing or preventing the exposures. Comparison of these attributes with the characteristics described in Table  5 should enable the selection of the appropriate band for the constraint or the reference level. The specific value for the constraint or reference level may then be established by a process of generic optimisation that takes account of national or regional attributes and preferences together, where appropriate, with a consideration of international guidance and good practice elsewhere.
Dose limits
(243) Dose limits apply only in planned exposure situations but not to medical exposures of patients. The Commission has concluded that the existing dose limits that it recommended in Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991b) continue to provide an appropriate level of protection. The nominal detriment coefficients for both a workforce and the general public are consistent with, although numerically somewhat lower than, those given in 1990. These slight differences are of no practical significance (see Annex A). Within a category of exposure, occupational or public, dose limits apply to the sum of exposures from sources related to practices that are already justified. The recommended dose limits are summarised in Table 6 .
(244) For occupational exposure in planned exposure situations, the Commission continues to recommend that the limit should be expressed as an effective dose of 20 mSv per year, averaged over defined 5 year periods (100 mSv in 5 years), with the further provision that the effective dose should not exceed 50 mSv in any single year.
(245) For public exposure in planned exposure situations, the Commission continues to recommend that the limit should be expressed as an effective dose of 1 mSv in a year. However, in special circumstances a higher value of effective dose could be allowed in a single year, provided that the average over defined 5-year periods does not exceed 1 mSv per year.
(246) The limits on effective dose apply to the sum of doses due to external exposures and committed doses from internal exposures due to intakes of radionuclides. In Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991b), the Commission stated that occupational intakes may be averaged over a period of 5 years to provide some flexibility. The Commission maintains this view. Similarly, averaging of public intakes over a period of 5 years would be acceptable in such special circumstances where averaging of the dose to members of the public could be allowed (see the previous paragraph).
(247) Dose limits do not apply in emergency exposure situations where an informed, exposed individual is engaged in volunteered life-saving actions or is attempting to prevent a catastrophic situation. For informed volunteers undertaking urgent rescue operations, the normal dose restriction may be relaxed. However, responders undertaking recovery and restoration operations in a later phase of emergency exposure situations should be considered as occupationally exposed workers and should be protected according to normal occupational radiological protection standards, and their exposures should not exceed the occupational dose limits recommended by the Commission. Since the Commission recommends specific protection measures for female workers who have declared that they are pregnant or are nursing an infant (see Section 5.4.1), and taking account of the unavoidable uncertainties surrounding early response measures in the event of an emergency exposure situation, female workers in those conditions should not be employed as first responders undertaking life-saving or other urgent actions. 500 mSv 50 mSv Hands and feet 500 mSv a Limits on effective dose are for the sum of the relevant effective doses from external exposure in the specified time period and the committed effective dose from intakes of radionuclides in the same period. For adults, the committed effective dose is computed for a 50-year period after intake, whereas for children it is computed for the period up to age 70 years. b This limit is currently being reviewed by an ICRP Task Group. c The limitation on effective dose provides sufficient protection for the skin against stochastic effects. d Averaged over 1 cm 2 area of skin regardless of the area exposed. e With the further provision that the effective dose should not exceed 50 mSv in any single year. Additional restrictions apply to the occupational exposure of pregnant women. f In special circumstances, a higher value of effective dose could be allowed in a single year, provided that the average over 5 years does not exceed 1 mSv per year.
(248) For informed individuals of the general public involved in caring and comforting patients released from a hospital following therapy with unsealed radionuclides, the normal dose restriction may be relaxed and such individuals should in general not be subject to the public dose limit (see Section 7.6).
(249) In addition to the limits on effective dose, limits were set in Publication 60 for the lens of the eye and localised areas of skin because these tissues will not necessarily be protected against tissue reactions by the limit on effective dose. The relevant values were set out in terms of the equivalent dose. These dose limits remain unchanged (see Table 6 ). However, new data on the radiosensitivity of the eye with regard to visual impairment are expected. The Commission will consider these data and their possible significance for the equivalent dose limit for the lens of the eye when they become available. Because of the uncertainty concerning this risk, there should be particular emphasis on optimisation in situations of exposure of the eyes.
(250) The dose limits for tissues are given in equivalent dose. The reason for this is that the Commission assumes that the relevant RBE values for the deterministic effects are always lower than w R values for stochastic effects. It is, thus, safely inferred that the dose limits provide at least as much protection against high-LET radiation as against low-LET radiation. The Commission, therefore, believes that it is sufficiently conservative to use w R with regard to deterministic effects. In special situations where high-LET radiation is the critical factor and where it predominantly exposes a single tissue (such as the skin), it will be more appropriate to express the exposure in terms of the absorbed dose and to take into account the appropriate RBE (see Annex B). To avoid confusion, it is necessary to clearly mention whenever an RBE-weighted absorbed dose in Gy is used.
(251) The Commission's multi-attribute approach to the selection of dose limits necessarily includes societal judgements applied to the many attributes of risk. These judgements would not necessarily be the same in all contexts and, in particular, might be different in different societies. It is for this reason that the Commission intends its guidance to be sufficiently flexible to allow for national or regional variations. In the Commission's view, however, any such variations in the protection of the most highly exposed individuals are best introduced by the use of source-related dose constraints selected by regulatory authorities and applied in the process of optimisation of protection. ICRP 20 (1). ICRP, 1991b ICRP, . 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 60. Ann. ICRP 21 (1-3).
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
(252) The previous chapter describes the Commission's system of protection to be applied in all situations requiring a decision on the control of radiation exposures. This chapter addresses the implementation of the system in the three types of exposure situations: planned, emergency, and existing. Particular attention is focused on areas where implementation of the Recommendations may not be immediately straightforward. In a number of these areas, there is further guidance from the Commission as indicated in the text. A section comparing the radiological protection criteria in these Recommendations with those in the previous Recommendations, Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991b) and derivative publications, is included. The last section of this chapter addresses common aspects of the implementation of the Commission's Recommendations, notably the responsibilities of the users and regulatory authorities.
Planned exposure situations
(253) Planned exposure situations are where radiological protection can be planned in advance, before exposures occur, and where the magnitude and extent of the exposures can be reasonably predicted. The term encompasses sources and situations that have been appropriately managed within the Commission's previous recommendations for practices. In introducing a planned exposure situation all aspects relevant to radiological protection should be considered. These aspects will include, as appropriate, design, construction, operation, decommissioning, waste management, and rehabilitation of previously occupied land and installations, and will take account of potential exposures as well as normal exposures. Planned exposure situations also include the medical exposure of patients, including their comforters and carers. The principles of protection for planned situations also apply to planned work in connection with existing and emergency exposure situations, once the emergency has been brought under control. Recommendations for planned situations are substantially unchanged from those provided in Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991b) and subsequent publications for the normal operation of practices and protection in medicine. Because of its specific characteristics, medical exposure is discussed separately in Chapter 7.
(254) All categories of exposure can occur in planned exposure situations, i.e., occupational exposure (Section 6.1.1), public exposure (Section 6.1.2), and medical exposure of patients, including their comforters and carers (Chapter 7). The design and development of planned situations should have proper regard for potential exposures that may result from deviations from normal operating conditions. Due attention should be paid to the assessment of potential exposures and to the related issue of the safety and security of radiation sources (Section 6.1.3).
Occupational exposure
(255) The Commission has previously recommended general principles for the radiological protection of workers (Publication 75, ICRP, 1997a). These principles remain valid.
(256) The Commission continues to recommend that occupational exposure in planned exposure situations be controlled by the procedures of optimisation below a source-related constraint (see Section 5.9.1) and the use of prescriptive dose limits (see Section 5.10). A constraint should be defined at the design stage of a planned exposure situation for its operation. For many types of work in planned exposure situations, it is possible to reach conclusions about the level of individual doses likely to be incurred in well-managed operations. This information can then be used to establish a dose constraint for that type of work. This work should be specified in fairly broad terms, such as work in industrial radiography, the routine operation of nuclear power plants, or work in medical establishments. However, there may also be more specific situations where a constraint can be established to guide particular activities.
(257) It will usually be appropriate for such dose constraints to be set at the operational level. When using a dose constraint, a designer should specify the sources to which the constraint is linked so as to avoid confusion with other sources to which the workforce might be concurrently exposed. The source-related dose constraint for occupational exposure in planned situations should be set to ensure that the dose limit is not exceeded (see Section 5.10). Experience gained in managing workers exposed to radiation will inform the choice of a value for a constraint for occupational exposure. For this reason, large established organisations, having a comprehensive radiological protection infrastructure, will often set their own constraints for occupational exposure. Smaller organisations with less relevant experience may require further guidance on this topic from the appropriate expert bodies or regulatory authorities. Nevertheless, the overall responsibility for setting constraints lies with those who are responsible for worker exposure.
(258) Protection of transient or itinerant workers requires particular attention because of the potential shared responsibility of several employers and licensees. In addition, sometimes several regulatory authorities are involved. Such workers include contractors for maintenance operations in nuclear power plants and industrial radiographers, who are not on the staff of the operator. In order to provide for their protection, adequate consideration needs to be given to the previous exposures of these workers so as to ensure that dose limits are also respected, and their exposure should be followed up. Thus there should be an adequate degree of co-operation between the employer of the itinerant worker and the operators of the plants for whom contracts are being undertaken. Regulatory authorities should ensure that regulations are adequate in this respect.
Public exposure
(259) In planned exposure situations, the Commission continues to recommend that public exposure be controlled by the procedures of optimisation below the source-related constraint and by the use of dose limits. In general, especially for public exposure, each source will cause a distribution of doses over many individuals, so the concept of a Representative Person should be used to represent the more highly exposed individuals (ICRP, 2006a) . Constraints for members of the public in planned exposure situations should be smaller than public dose limits, and would typically be set by the national regulatory authorities.
(260) For the control of public exposure from waste disposal, the Commission has previously recommended that a value for the dose constraint for members of the public of no more than about 0.3 mSv in a year would be appropriate (ICRP, 1997d) . These Recommendations were further elaborated for the planned disposal of long-lived radioactive waste in Publication 81 (ICRP, 1998b) .
(261) In Publication 82 (ICRP, 1999a), the Commission issued guidance that in circumstances where there are planned discharges of long-lived radionuclides to the environment, planning assessments should consider whether build-up in the environment would result in the constraint being exceeded, taking account of any reasonable combination and build-up of exposures. Where such verification considerations are not possible or are too uncertain, it would be prudent to apply a dose constraint of the order of 0.1 mSv in a year to the prolonged component of the dose attributable to the long-lived artificial radionuclides. In planned exposure situations involving natural radioactive material, this limitation is not feasible and not required (ICRP, 1999a) . These Recommendations remain valid. In order to ensure that the build-up of annual doses from continuing practices does not cause dose limits to be exceeded in the future, the dose commitment can be used (ICRP, 1991b , IAEA, 2000b . This is the total dose that would eventually result from an event, such as a year of a planned activity causing discharges. Some flexibility may be required for particular situations involving long-lived natural radionuclides, such as past mining and milling activities (see Sections 2.3 and 5.2.2 of Publication 82, ICRP, 1999a).
Potential exposures
(262) In planned exposure situations, a certain level of exposure is reasonably expected to occur. However, higher exposures may arise following deviations from planned operating procedures, accidents including the loss of control of radiation sources, and malevolent events. Such exposures are not planned to occur, although the situation is planned. These exposures are referred to by the Commission as potential exposures. Deviations from planned operating procedures and accidents can often be foreseen and their probability of occurrence estimated, but they cannot be predicted in detail. Loss of control of radiation sources and malevolent events are less predictable and call for a specific approach.
(263) There is usually an interaction between potential exposures and the exposures arising from planned operations in normal operation; for example, actions taken to reduce the exposure during normal operations may increase the probability of potential exposures. Thus, the storage of long-lived waste rather than its dispersal could reduce the exposures from discharges but would increase potential exposures. In order to control potential exposure, certain surveillance and maintenance activities will be undertaken. These activities may increase normal exposures.
(264) Potential exposures should be considered at the planning stage of the introduction of a planned exposure situation. It should be recognised that the potential for exposures may lead to actions both to reduce the probability of the events occurring, and to limit and reduce the exposure (mitigation) if any event were to occur (ICRP, 1991b (ICRP, , 1997b . Due consideration should be afforded to potential exposures during application of the principles of justification and optimisation.
(265) Potential exposure broadly covers three types of events.
Events where the potential exposures would primarily affect individuals who are also subject to planned exposures: The number of individuals is usually small, and the detriment involved is the health risk to the directly exposed persons. The processes by which such exposures occur are relatively simple, e.g., the potential unsafe entry into an irradiation room. The Commission has given specific guidance for the protection from potential exposures in such circumstances in Publication 76 (ICRP, 1997b) . This guidance remains valid. Some additional examples are discussed in Section 7.5 on accidents in medical contexts. Events where the potential exposures could affect a larger number of people and not only involve health risks but also other detriments, such as contaminated land and the need to control food consumption: The mechanisms involved are complicated and an example is the potential for a major accident in a nuclear reactor or the malicious use of radioactive material. The Commission has provided a conceptual framework for the protection from such type of events in Publication 64 (ICRP, 1993a) . This framework remains valid. In Publication 96 (ICRP, 2005a) , the Commission provides some additional advice concerning radiological protection after events involving malicious intent. Events in which the potential exposures could occur far in the future, and the doses be delivered over long time periods, e.g., in the case of solid waste disposal in deep repositories: Considerable uncertainties surround exposures taking place in the far future. Thus dose estimates should not be regarded as measures of health detriment beyond times of around several hundreds of years into the future. Rather, they represent indicators of the protection afforded by the disposal system. The Commission has given specific guidance for the disposal of long-lived solid radioactive waste in Publication 81 (ICRP, 1998b) . This guidance remains valid.
Assessment of potential exposures (266) The evaluation of potential exposures, for the purpose of planning or judging protection measures, is usually based on: a) the construction of scenarios which are intended typically to represent the sequence of events leading to the exposures; b) the assessment of probabilities of each of these sequences; c) the assessment of the resulting dose; d) the evaluation of detriment associated with that dose; e) comparison of the results with some criterion of acceptability; and f) optimisation of protection which may require several iterations of the previous steps.
(267) The principles of constructing and analysing scenarios are well known and are often used in engineering. Their application was discussed in Publication 76 (ICRP, 1997b) . Decisions on the acceptability of potential exposures should take account of both the probability of occurrence of the exposure and its magnitude. In some circumstances, decisions can be made by separate consideration of these two factors. In other circumstances, it is useful to consider the individual probability of radiation-related death, rather than the effective dose (ICRP, 1997b) . For this purpose, the probability is defined as the product of the probability of incurring the dose in a year and the lifetime probability of radiation-related death from the dose conditional on the dose being incurred. The resulting probability can then be compared with a risk constraint. If the probability is lower than the risk constraint, it may be tolerated. Both of these approaches are discussed in the Commission's Recommendations for the disposal of long-lived solid radioactive waste in Publication 81 (ICRP, 1998b) .
(268) Risk constraints, like dose constraints, are source-related and in principle should equate to a similar health risk to that implied by the corresponding dose constraints for the same source. However, there can be large uncertainties in estimations of the probability of an unsafe situation and the resulting dose. Thus, it will often be sufficient to use a generic value for a risk constraint. In the case of workers, this could be based on generalisations about normal occupational exposures, rather than on a more specific study of the particular operation. Where the Commission's system of dose limitation has been applied and protection is optimised, annual occupational effective doses to an average individual may be as high as about 5 mSv in certain selected types of operation (UNSCEAR, 2000) . For potential exposures of workers, the Commission therefore continues to recommend a generic risk constraint of 2 10 À4 per year which is similar to the probability of fatal cancer associated with an average occupational annual dose of 5 mSv (ICRP, 1997b) . For potential exposures of the public, the Commission continues to recommend a risk constraint of 1 10 À5 per year.
(269) The use of probability assessment is limited by the extent that unlikely events can be forecast. In circumstances where accidents can occur as a result of a wide spectrum of initiating events, caution should be exercised over any estimate of overall probabilities because of the serious uncertainty of predicting the existence of all the unlikely initiating events. In many circumstances, more information can be obtained for decision-making purposes by considering the probability of occurrence and the resultant doses separately.
(270) In large nuclear installations, dose criteria as a design basis of accident prevention and mitigation may be prescribed by the regulatory agency for selected potential exposure scenarios. The dose criteria applied here for the potential exposure should be derived from the risk constraints by taking account of the probability of the accident.
Safety and security of radiation sources and malevolent events (271) Potential exposures associated with planned exposure situations may result from the loss of control of radiation sources. This situation has received a growing attention over recent years and deserves a special consideration from the Commission. The Recommendations of the Commission presume that, as a precondition for adequate radiological protection, radiation sources are subject to proper security measures (ICRP, 1991b) . The control of radiation exposure in all planned exposure situations is exercised by the application of controls at the source rather than in the environment. The Commission's view is reflected in the International Basic Safety Standards (BSS), which require that the control of sources shall not be relinquished under any circumstances (IAEA, 1996) . The BSS also requires that sources be kept secure so as to prevent theft or damage. In addition, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources establishes basic principles applicable to the security of radioactive sources (IAEA, 2004) . The Commission supports the global strengthening of the control of radiation sources.
(272) Security of radioactive sources is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to ensure source safety. Radioactive sources can be secure, i.e., under proper control, for instance preventing malicious use of the sources, and still not safe, i.e., prone to accidents. Thus the Commission has historically included aspects of security in its system of protection (ICRP, 1991b) . In the context of safety, security provisions are generally limited to general controls necessary to prevent loss, access, unauthorised possession or transfer and use of the material, devices or installations. Measures to ensure that the control of radioactive material and access to radiation devices and installations are not relinquished are also essential to maintain safety.
(273) The Commission's 1990 Recommendations did not give attention to measures specifically to protect against terrorism or other malicious acts. However, it has become evident that radiation safety must also include the potential for such scenarios. Past experience with unintentional breaches in source security, or where a discarded or orphan source was found by individuals unaware of the radiation hazard, indicates what might occur if radioactive materials are used intentionally to cause harm, e.g., by deliberate dispersion of radioactive material in a public area. Such events have the potential for exposing people to radiation and causing significant environmental contamination, which would require specific radiological protection measures (ICRP, 2005a).
Emergency exposure situations
(274) Even if all reasonable steps have been taken during the design stage to reduce the probability and consequences of potential exposures, such exposures may need to be considered in relation to emergency preparedness and response. Emergency exposure situations are unexpected situations that may require urgent protective actions, and perhaps also longer-term protective actions, to be implemented. Exposure of members of the public or of workers, as well as environmental contamination can occur in these situations. Exposures can be complex in the sense that they may result from several independent pathways, perhaps acting simultaneously. Furthermore, radiological hazards may be accompanied by other hazards (chemical, physical, etc.) . Response actions should be planned because potential emergency exposure situations can be assessed in advance, to a greater or lesser accuracy depending upon the type of installation or situation being considered. However, because actual emergency exposure situations are inherently unpredictable, the exact nature of necessary protection measures cannot be known in advance but must flexibly evolve to meet actual circumstances. The complexity and variability of these situations give them a unique character that merits their specific treatment by the Commission in its Recommendations.
(275) The Commission has set out general principles for planning intervention in the case of a radiation emergency in Publications 60 and 63 (ICRP, 1991b (ICRP, , 1992 . Additional relevant advice is given in Publications 86, 96, 97, and 98 (ICRP, 2000c , 2005b , 2005c . While the general principles and additional advice remain valid, the Commission is now extending its guidance on the application of protective measures on the basis of recent developments in emergency preparedness and of experience since publication of its previous advice.
(276) The Commission now emphasises the importance of justifying and optimising protection strategies for application in emergency exposure situations, the optimisation process being guided by reference levels (see Section 5.9). The possibility of multiple, independent, simultaneous, and time-varying exposure pathways makes it important to focus on the overall exposures that may occur from all pathways when developing and implementing protective measures. As such, an overall protection strategy is necessary, generally including an assessment of the radiological situation and implementation of different protective measures. These measures may well vary with time, as the emergency exposure situation evolves, and with place, as the emergency exposure situation may affect distinct geographic areas differently. The overall exposure, which is projected to occur as a result of the emergency exposure situation, should no protective actions be employed, is called the projected dose. The dose that would result when a protection strategy is implemented is called the residual dose. In addition, each protective measure will avert a certain amount of exposure. This is referred to as averted dose, and is the concept for the optimisation of the individual protective measures as given in Publication 63 (ICRP, 1992) that will make up the overall protection strategy. The Commission now recommends focusing on optimisation with respect to the overall strategy, rather than the individual measures. However, the levels of averted dose recommended in Publication 63 for optimisation of protection in terms of individual protective measures may still be useful as inputs to the development of the overall response (see also Publication 96, ICRP, 2005a).
(277) In emergency exposure situations particular attention should be given to the prevention of severe deterministic health effects as doses could reach high levels in a short period of time. In case of major emergencies an assessment based on health effects would be insufficient and due considerations must be given to societal, economic and other consequences. Another important objective is to prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of societal and economic activities considered as 'normal'.
(278) In planning for emergency situations, reference levels should be applied in the process of optimisation. Reference levels for the highest planned residual doses in emergency situations are typically in the 20 mSv to 100 mSv band of projected dose as presented in Section 5.9.3. Expected residual doses for the overall protection strategies are compared with the reference levels in initially assessing the suitability of the strategies. A protection strategy that would not reduce residual doses to below the reference levels should be rejected at the planning stage.
(279) Planning should result in a set of actions that would be implemented automatically once an emergency exposure situation has occurred, should the actual circumstances require such urgent actions. Following a decision on such immediate action, the projected residual dose distribution can be assessed, and the reference level acts as a benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of protection strategies and the need to modify or take additional actions. All exposures above or below the reference level should be subject to optimisation of protection, and particular attention should be given to exposures above the reference level.
(280) When preparing a protection strategy for a particular emergency exposure situation, a number of different populations, each needing specific protective measures, may be identified. For example, the distance from the origin of an emergency exposure situation (e.g., an installation, an emergency site) may be important in terms of identifying the magnitude of exposures to be considered, and thus the types and urgency of protective measures. With this diversity of exposed populations in mind, the planning of protective measures should be based on exposures to the Representative Persons, as described in Publication 101 (ICRP, 2006a), from the various populations that have been identified. After an emergency situation has occurred, planned protection measures should evolve to best address the actual conditions of all exposed populations being considered. Particular attention should be given to pregnant women and children.
(281) Emergency plans should be developed (in more or less detail, as appropriate) to cope with all possible scenarios. The development of an emergency plan (national, local, or installation specific) is a multi-step iterative process that includes assessment, planning, resource allocation, training, exercises, audit, and revision. The radiation emergency response plans should be integrated into all-hazards emergency management programmes.
(282) In the event that an emergency exposure situation occurs, the first issue is to recognise its onset. The initial response should be to follow the emergency plan in a consistent but flexible way. The protection strategy initially implemented will be that described in the emergency plan for the relevant event scenario, based on the generic optimisation undertaken as part of the planning stage. Once the measures in the emergency plan have been initiated, emergency response can be characterised by an iterative cycle of review, planning, and execution.
(283) Emergency response is inevitably a process that develops in time from a situation of little information to one of potentially overwhelming information, with the expectations for protection and involvement by those affected similarly increasing rapidly with time. As discussed in Publication 96 (ICRP, 2005a), three phases of an emergency exposure situation are considered: the early phase (which may be divided into a warning and possible release phase), the intermediate phase (which starts with the cessation of any release and regaining control of the source of releases), and the late phase. At any stage, decision-makers will necessarily have an incomplete understanding of the situation regarding the future impact, the effectiveness of protective measures, and the concerns of those directly and indirectly affected, amongst other factors. An effective response must therefore be developed flexibly with regular review of its impact. The reference level provides an important input to this review, providing a benchmark against which what is known about the situation and the protection afforded by implemented measures can be compared. The management of long-term contamination resulting from an emergency situation is treated as an existing exposure situation (see Section 6.3).
Existing exposure situations
(284) Existing exposure situations are those that already exist when a decision on control has to be taken. There are many types of existing exposure situations that may cause exposures high enough to warrant radiological protective actions, or at least their consideration. Radon in dwellings or the workplace, and naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) are well-known examples. It may also be necessary to take radiological protection decisions concerning existing man-made exposure situations such as residues in the environment resulting from radiological emissions from operations that were not conducted within the Commission's system of protection, or contaminated land resulting from an accident or a radiological event. There are also existing exposure situations for which it will be obvious that action to reduce exposures is not warranted. The decision as to what components of existing exposure are not amenable to control requires a judgement by the regulatory authority that will depend on the controllability of the source or exposure, and also on the prevailing economic, societal, and cultural circumstances. Principles for exclusion and exemption of radiation sources are presented and discussed in Section 2.3.
(285) Existing exposure situations can be complex in that they may involve several exposure pathways and they generally give rise to wide distributions of annual individual doses ranging from the very low to, in rare cases, several tens of millisieverts. Such situations often involve dwellings, for example in the case of radon, and in many cases the behaviour of the exposed individuals determines the level of exposure. Another example is the distribution of individual exposures in a long-term contaminated territory, which directly reflects differences in the dietary habits of the affected inhabitants. The multiplicity of exposure pathways and the importance of individual behaviour may result in exposure situations that are difficult to control.
(286) The Commission recommends that reference levels, set in terms of individual dose, should be used in conjunction with the implementation of the optimisation process for exposures in existing exposure situations. The objective is to implement optimised protection strategies, or a progressive range of such strategies, which will reduce individual doses to below the reference level. However, exposures below the reference level should not be ignored; these exposure circumstances should also be assessed to ascertain whether protection is optimised, or whether further protective measures are needed. An endpoint for the optimisation process must not be fixed a priori and the optimised level of protection will depend on the situation. It is the responsibility of regulatory authorities to decide on the legal status of the reference level, which is implemented to control a given situation. Retrospectively, when protective actions have been implemented, reference levels may also be used as benchmarks for assessing the effectiveness of the protection strategies. The use of reference levels in an existing situation is illustrated in Fig. 4 , which shows the evolution of the distribution of individual doses with time as a result of the optimisation process.
(287) Reference levels for existing exposure situations should be set typically in the 1 mSv to 20 mSv band of projected dose as presented in Sections 5.9.2 and 5.9.3 and Table 5 . The individuals concerned should receive general information on the exposure situation and the means of reducing their doses. In situations where individual life-styles are key drivers of the exposures, individual monitoring or assessment as well as education and training may be important requirements. Living on contaminated land after a nuclear accident or a radiological event is a typical situation of that sort.
(288) The main factors to be considered for setting the reference levels for existing exposure situations are the feasibility of controlling the situation, and the past experience with the management of similar situations. In most existing exposure situations, there is a desire from the exposed individual, as well as from the authorities, to reduce exposures to levels that are close to or similar to situations considered as 'normal'. This applies particularly in situations of exposures from material resulting from human actions, e.g., NORM residues and contamination from accidents.
Indoor radon in dwellings and workplaces
(289) Exposure to radon in dwellings and workplaces may arise from existing exposure situations or from practices, e.g., storage or processing of monazite sands. The Commission has previously made specific recommendations in relation to radon exposure (ICRP, 1993b) . Since then, several epidemiological studies have confirmed the risk of radon-222 exposure even at relatively moderate concentrations (UNSCE-AR, 2008) . European, North American, and Chinese residential case-control studies also demonstrate a significant association between the risk of lung cancer and exposure to residential radon-222 (Darby et al., 2006 , Krewski et al., 2006 , Lubin et al., 2004 . These studies have generally provided support for the Commission's Recommendations on protection against radon.
(290) There is now a remarkable coherence between the risk estimates developed from epidemiological studies of miners and residential case-control radon studies. While the miner studies provide a strong basis for evaluating risks from radon exposure and for investigating the effects of modifiers to the dose-response relation, the results of the recent pooled residential studies now provide a direct method of estimating risks to people at home without the need for extrapolation from miner studies (UNSCEAR, 2008) .
(291) The Commission's view on radon risk assessment has, until now, been that it should incorporate epidemiological studies of miners. Given the wealth of data now available on domestic exposure to radon, the Commission recommends that the estimation of risk from domestic radon exposure should include the results of pooled residential case control radon-222 studies. However, there is still great value in the miner epidemiology studies for investigating dose response relationships and confounding effects of smoking and exposure to other agents. The currently available epidemiological evidence indicates that risks other than lung cancer from exposure to radon-222 (and decay products) are likely to be small.
(292) The underlying theme of the Commission's Recommendations on radon is the controllability of exposure. The ability to control exposure distinguishes the circumstances under which exposure to radon in workplaces, including underground mines, may need to be subject to the Commission's system of protection and where the need for action to limit radon exposure in dwellings should be considered. There are several reasons for treating radon-222 in this separate manner. The exposure route differs from that of other natural sources, and there are dosimetric and epidemiological issues specific to radon-222. For many individuals radon-222 is an important source of exposure which, in principle, can be controlled. The Commission issued the current recommendations for protection against radon-222 at home and at work in Publication 65 (ICRP, 1993b) . The policy has found wide acceptance and the present Recommendations broadly continue the same policy, with an adaptation to the new approach based on exposure situations and where a central role is given to the optimisation principle and the use of reference levels.
(293) In Publication 65 (ICRP, 1993b), the policy was based upon first setting a level to an effective dose of 10 mSv per year from radon-222 where action would almost certainly be warranted to reduce the exposure. Regulatory authorities were expected to apply the optimisation of protection in a generic way to find a lower level at which to act, in the range from 3 to 10 mSv. The effective dose was converted by a dose conversion convention into a value of radon-222 concentration, which was different between homes and workplaces largely because of the different number of hours spent at each. For dwellings this range was a radon concentration of 200-600 Bq m À3 , while the corresponding range for workplaces was 500-1500 Bq m À3 . The result of the optimisation was to set action levels, i.e., levels above which action was required to reduce the dose.
(294) The Commission now recommends applying the source-related principles of radiological protection for controlling radon exposure. This means that national authorities need to set national reference levels to aid the optimisation of protection. Even though the nominal risk per Sv has changed slightly, the Commission, for the sake of continuity and practicality, retains the upper value of 10 mSv for the individual dose reference level, and the corresponding activity concentrations as given in Publication 65 (ICRP, 1993b) . Thus, the upper values for the reference level expressed in activity concentrations remain at 1500 Bq m À3 for workplaces and 600 Bq m À3 for homes (Table 7) .
(295) It is the responsibility of the appropriate national authorities, as with other sources, to establish their own national reference levels, taking into account the prevailing economic and societal circumstances and then to apply the process of optimisation of protection in their country. All reasonable efforts should be made to reduce radon-222 exposures in homes and at work places to below the reference levels that are set at the national level and to a level where protection can be considered optimised. The actions taken should be intended to produce substantial reduction in radon exposures. It is not sufficient to adopt marginal improvements aimed only Head or initial radionuclide of the decay chain activity level.
ICRP Publication 103
at reducing the radon concentrations to a value just below the national reference level.
(296) The implementation of the optimisation process should result in concentration activities below the national reference levels. In general, no further action will be required apart from perhaps monitoring activity concentration sporadically to ensure that levels remain low. National authorities should, however, periodically review the values of the national reference levels for radon exposure to ensure that they remain appropriate.
(297) Responsibility for taking action against radon in houses and other premises will often fall on the individual owners, who cannot be expected to carry out a detailed optimisation exercise for each property. Therefore, in addition to reference levels, regulatory authorities may also wish to specify levels at which protection against radon-222 can be considered optimised, i.e., where no further action is needed. The Commission's view continues to be that there is merit in defining radon-prone areas in which the concentration of radon in buildings is likely to be higher than is typical of the country as a whole. This allows attention to be focused on radon where it is most exigent and action to be concentrated where it is most likely to be effective (ICRP, 1993b) .
(298) Radon exposure at work at levels above the national reference level should be considered part of occupational exposure whereas exposures at levels below should not. In the interest of international harmonisation of occupational safety standards, a single action level value of 1000 Bq m À3 was established in the BSS (IAEA, 1996) . For the same reasons, the Commission considers that this internationally established value, which is a reference value in current terminology, might be used globally to define the entry point for occupational protection requirements for exposure situations to radon. In fact, this international level serves as a much needed globally harmonised monitoring and record-keeping system. This is relevant for determining when the occupational radiological protection requirements applyi.e., what is actually included within the system of regulatory control. On this basis the BSS establishes limits on intake and exposures for radon and thoron progeny (see Table II .1 in IAEA, 1996).
Protection of the embryo/fetus in emergency and existing exposure situation
(299) In Publication 82 (ICRP, 1999a), the Commission concluded that prenatal exposure would not be a specific protection case, i.e., would not require protective actions other than those aimed at the general population. The protection of the embryo/fetus and infants is discussed in Section 5.4.1. In Publication 82 (ICRP, 1999a), the Commission provided practical recommendations concerning in-utero exposures. Dose coefficients for the embryo/fetus due to intakes of radionuclides by the mother were provided in Publication 88 (ICRP, 2001a) . The Commission's conclusion in Publication 90 (ICRP, 2003a) was that newly available information on in-utero risk at low doses (up to a few tens of mSv) supported the advice developed in Publications 60, 82, 84, and 88 (ICRP 1991b 82, 84, and 88 (ICRP , 1999a 82, 84, and 88 (ICRP , 2000a 82, 84, and 88 (ICRP , 2001a . The Commission position on these issues remains unchanged.
Comparison of radiological protection criteria
(300) The current recommended values for protection criteria are compared in Table 8 with those provided by the previous Recommendations in Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991b) and the derivative publications. The comparison shows that the current Recommendations are essentially the same as the previous Recommendations for planned exposure situations. In the case of existing and emergency exposure situations, the current Recommendations generally encompass the previous values but are wider in their scope of application. It should be noted that in some cases the values cited are in different quantities; for example, in emergency exposure situ- Table 8 . Comparison of protection criteria between the 1990 and the 2007 Recommendations (numbers in brackets refer to ICRP Publication numbers; ICRP, 1991b ICRP, ,c, 1992 ICRP, , 1993b ICRP, , 1994b ICRP, , 1997a ICRP, ,d, 1998b ICRP, , 1999a ICRP, , 2004b ICRP, , 2005a ations the criteria in Publication 60 (ICRP, 1991b) are specified in terms of averted dose (intervention levels) whereas the criteria in the current Recommendations are specified in terms of incremental dose (reference levels). These differences are noted in Table 8 .
6.6. Practical implementation (301) This section addresses the general implementation of the Commission's Recommendations, dealing with factors which are common to the three types of exposure situations. It focuses on organisational features that may help in the implementation of the Commission's Recommendations. Since the organisational structures will differ from country to country, the chapter is illustrative rather than exhaustive. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD issue further advice on the infrastructure required for radiological protection in various circumstances to their member states (e.g., see IAEA, 1996 , 2002 , and NEA, 2005 . Generic advice on organisation for health and safety at work is provided by the International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization and the Pan-American Health Organization.
6.6.1. The infrastructure for radiological protection and safety (302) An infrastructure is required to ensure that an appropriate standard of protection is maintained. This infrastructure includes at least a legal framework, a regulatory authority, the operating management of any undertaking involving ionising radiation (including the design, operation, and decommissioning of equipment and installations as well as adventitious enhancement of natural radiation including aviation and space flight), and the employees at such undertakings. It may include additional organisations and persons responsible for protection and safety.
(303) The legal framework must provide for the regulation, as required, of undertakings involving ionising radiation and for the clear assignment of responsibilities for protection and safety. A regulatory authority must be responsible for the regulatory control, whenever required, of undertakings involving radiation and for the enforcement of the regulations. This regulatory authority must be clearly separate from organisations that conduct or promote activities causing radiation exposure.
(304) The nature of radiological hazards necessitates a number of special features in the legal framework and the provision of expertise within the regulatory authority. The important issues are that radiological questions are addressed properly, that the appropriate expertise is available, and that decisions concerning radiation safety cannot be unduly influenced by economic or other non-radiological considerations.
(305) The primary responsibility for achieving and maintaining a satisfactory control of radiation exposures rests on the management bodies of the institutions conducting the operations giving rise to the exposures. When equipment or plant is designed and supplied by other institutions, they, in turn, have a responsibility to see that the items supplied will be satisfactory, if used as intended. Governments have the responsibility to set up national authorities, which then have the responsibility for providing a regulatory, and often also an advisory, framework to emphasise the responsibilities of the management bodies while, at the same time, setting and enforcing overall standards of protection. They may also have to take direct responsibility when, as with exposures to many natural sources, there is no relevant management body.
(306) There are various reasons why there may not be a relevant operating management available. For instance, the radiation may not have been caused by any human actions, or an activity may have been abandoned and the proprietors could have disappeared. In such cases, the national regulatory authority, or some other designated body, will have to accept some of the responsibilities usually carried by the operating management.
(307) In all organisations, the responsibilities and the associated authority are delegated to an extent depending on the complexity of the duties involved. The working of this delegation should be examined regularly. However, the management of the organisation remains accountable for the provision of adequate radiological protection, and the delegation of tasks and responsibilities does not detract from that accountability. There should be a clear line of accountability running right to the top of each organisation. There is also an interaction between the various kinds of organisation. Advisory and regulatory authorities should be held accountable for the advice they give and any requirements they impose.
(308) Requirements, operating instructions, regulatory approvals and licences, and other administrative devices are not, of themselves, enough to achieve an appropriate standard of radiological protection. Everyone in an activity, from the individual workers and their representatives to the senior management, should regard protection and emergency prevention as integral parts of their everyday functions. Success and failure in these areas are at least as important as they are in the primary function of the activity.
(309) The imposition of requirements expressed in general terms and the acceptance of advice do not reduce the responsibility, or the accountability, of the operating organisations. This is also true in principle of prescriptive requirements, where the regulatory authority prescribes in detail how protection standards are to be maintained. However, prescriptive requirements concerning the conduct of operations result in some de facto transfer of responsibility and accountability from the user to the regulatory authority. In the long run, they also reduce the user's incentive for self-improvement. Therefore, it is usually better to adopt a regulatory regime that places a more explicit responsibility on the user, and forces the user to convince the regulatory authority that adequate protection methods and standards are used and maintained.
(310) Therefore, the use of prescriptive requirements should always be carefully justified. In any event, they should never be regarded as an alternative to the process of optimising protection. It is not satisfactory to set design or operational limits or targets as an arbitrary fraction of the dose limit, regardless of the particular nature of the plant and the operations. 6.6.2. External expertise and advice; delegation of authority (311) The prime responsibility for radiological protection and radiation safety in an undertaking involving ionising radiation rests with the operating organisation. In order to assume this responsibility, the organisation needs expertise in radiological protection. It is not always necessary or reasonable to demand that this expertise is available within the operating organisation. As an alternative, it may be acceptable and recommendable for the operating organisation to use consultants and advisory organisations, particularly if the operating organisation is small and the complexity of the radiological protection issues is limited.
(312) Such an arrangement will not in any way relieve the operating organisation of its responsibility. The role of a consultant or an advisory organisation will be to provide information and advice as necessary. It still remains the responsibility of the operating management to take decisions and actions on the basis of such advice, and individual employees still need to adhere to a 'safety culture', constantly asking themselves whether they have done all that they reasonably can to achieve a safe operation.
(313) Similarly, the use of consultants or advisory bodies will not in any way diminish or change the responsibility of the regulatory authority. Furthermore, it will be particularly important when the regulatory authority uses consultants that these are free from any conflicts of interest and are able to provide impartial advice. The need for transparency in decision making should also be kept in mind. 6.6.3. Incident reporting (314) An accident and incident reporting routine with feedback to users is indispensable in the prevention of emergencies. In order for such a system to work and achieve its goals, mutual trust is required. Licensing constitutes the formal confirmation of a regulatory authority's trust in a user. However, operating organisations also need to be able to trust the regulatory authority. A primary requirement is that all users are treated in a fair and equal manner. Honest reporting of a problem combined with immediate action to rectify the situation should be encouraged, not punished.
Management requirements
(315) The first, and in many ways the most important, of the practical steps in implementing the Commission's Recommendations is the establishment of a safety-based attitude in everyone concerned with all the operations from design to decommissioning. This can only be achieved by a substantial commitment to training and a recognition that safety is a personal responsibility and is of major concern to the top management.
(316) The explicit commitment of an organisation to safety should be made manifest by written policy statements from the highest level of management, by the establishment of formal management structures for dealing with radiological protection, by issuing clear operating instructions, and by clear and demonstrable support for those persons with direct responsibility for radiological protection in the workplace and the environment (Publication 75, ICRP, 1997a). To translate this commitment into effective action, senior management should identify appropriate design and operational criteria, determine organisational arrangements, assign clear responsibilities to put these policies into effect, and establish a culture within which all those in the organisation recognise the importance of restricting both normal and potential exposures to ionising radiation.
(317) There should be plans for dealing with accidents and emergencies. These plans should be subject to periodic review and exercise, and result in written management requirements. Planning for the event of emergencies should be an integral part of normal operating procedures. Any changes in responsibility, e.g., from the usual line of command to an emergency controller, should be planned in advance. Requirements to, and mechanisms for, implementing lessons learned should be established.
(318) The organisational approach should include involvement and participation of all workers. It is sustained by effective communications and the promotion of competence that enables all employees to make a responsible and informed contribution to the health and safety effort. The visible and active leadership of senior managers is necessary to develop and maintain a culture supportive of health and safety management. The aim is not simply to avoid accidents, but to motivate and empower people to work safely. It is important that management ensures that mechanisms are in place by which workers may provide feedback on radiological protection issues, and workers should be fully involved in developing methods to ensure that doses are as low as reasonably achievable.
(319) Another common responsibility of the operating management is to provide access to occupational services dealing with protection and health. The protection service should provide specialist advice and arrange any necessary monitoring provisions commensurate with the complexity of the operation and its potential hazards. The head of the protection service should have direct access to the senior operating management. The principal role of the occupational health service is the same as it is in any occupation. 6.6.5. Compliance with the intended standard of protection (320) The measurement or assessment of radiation doses is fundamental to the practice of radiological protection. Neither the equivalent dose in an organ nor the effective dose can be measured directly. Values of these quantities must be inferred with the aid of models, usually involving environmental, metabolic, and dosimetric components. Ideally, these models and the values chosen for their parameters should be realistic, so that the results they give can be described as 'best estimates'. Where practicable, estimates and discussion should be made of the uncertainties inherent in these results (see Section 4.4).
(321) All the organisations concerned with radiological protection should have a duty to verify their compliance with their own objectives and procedures. The operating management should establish a system for reviewing its organisational structure and its procedures, a function analogous to financial auditing. National authorities should conduct similar internal audits and should have the added duty of, and authority for, assessing both the level of protection achieved by operating managements and the degree of compliance with the regulatory provisions. All these verification procedures should include consideration of potential exposures by a verification of the safety provisions. Verification procedures should include a review of quality assurance programmes and some form of inspection. However, inspection is a form of sampling -it cannot cover all eventualities. It is best seen as a mechanism for persuading those inspected to put, and keep, their own houses in order.
